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A government decision to impose severe austerity measures in early June to balance the country's
soaring fiscal deficit led to massive protests by labor organizations, opposition parties, and even
the business community. As a result, President Sixto Duran Ballen's administration suspended the
measures and opened negotiations with Congress over alternative proposals to raise more state
revenue. The executive and the legislature are likely to come to terms fairly quickly. Nevertheless,
massive labor protests are expected to explode again in the coming weeks, since unions and
grassroots organizations adamantly oppose even the alternative austerity measures now under
discussion.
In April, the Duran Ballen administration announced that the one-month border war with Peru
which began on Jan. 26 and officially ended on Feb. 28 after both sides signed a peace accord in
Montevideo had thrown government finances into crisis. At that time, the executive estimated the
total impact of the war on the national economy at more than US$800 million. The estimate included
about US$350 million in direct government expenses to finance the war effort, about US$430 million
in losses suffered by the private sector, plus other indirect costs incurred by the government (see
NotiSur, 04/06/95).
In fact, as a result of the costs of the war, the government markedly scaled back its economic
forecasts for this year. In January, the government had predicted a 5% economic expansion in
1995, but that estimate was then lowered to just 3%, at best. Among the central factors contributing
to the decline in output was a substantial drop in foreign investment, plus a decline in domestic
production because of a huge surge in interest rates during the war. About US$166 million was
withdrawn from the national financial system in a panicked run on the banks after the war broke
out. In May, banking executives estimated that profits in the financial sector dropped by nearly
50% during the first quarter of 1995 compared with the same period in 1994, from US$26 million to
US$13.9 million. That, in turn, pushed interest rates up to triple-digit figures. At the height of the
war, for example, the key interbank rate what banks charge each other for overnight loans soared to
280%.
Still, by early June many of the financial problems caused by the war had largely subsided, with
liquidity in the national financial system nearly back to prewar levels. As of June 1, the Central Bank
reported that interbank rates had stabilized again in the 25% to 30% range, and corporate borrowing
rates had fallen to below 50%. In addition, the country's foreign reserves have climbed back above
US$1.7 billion, after falling to a low of US$1.508 billion in February, reflecting renewed confidence
among foreign investors. The recovery of reserves has helped steady the foreign exchange rate,
which in turn has alleviated inflationary pressures. The government now estimates that annual
inflation for 1995 will reach about 19% or 20%. That would represent four or five percentage points
more than the government's original target of 15% inflation for the year, but it would still mean
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a substantial drop compared with 1994, when annual inflation reached 25.4%. Indeed, monthly
inflation has tended downward since the war ended in February. In January, the consumer price
index grew by 3% up from just 1.29% in December and in February it grew by 2.57%. But in May,
monthly inflation had dropped back to 1.95%, and although the annual inflation rate for the 12month period ending in April was still running at 22.9%, the government expects monthly inflation
to continue to edge downward throughout the remaining months of the year.
Nevertheless, notwithstanding the improved economic outlook since May, the government is still
facing a huge fiscal deficit as a direct result of the war. According to the executive's estimates, the
war caused a whopping US$528 million fiscal gap for 1995, which, if accurate, would represent
more than 3% of GDP. In testimony before Congress in April and May, Finance Minister Mauricio
Pinto and the Central Bank's general manager, Augusto de la Torre, stated that the war's direct
costs during February only represent about one-third of the total 920 billion sucres (about US$360
million) that the government expects to have spent by the end of 1995 on the war effort. Military
stockpiles must still be replenished, infrastructure must be repaired, and a series of other costs must
be met, such as medical bills for wounded soldiers and indemnity for the family members of troops
killed in combat. According to the finance minister, because the border zone with Peru is still highly
unstable, the government must maintain a high defense budget for the rest of the year, which in
large part accounts for the additional war-related expenses projected through the end of 1995.
"Let's not forget that we fought a war with Peru that required funds from the beginning, that
continues to require funds, and which will require funds for a good time to come because the
conflict is not fully concluded," said Pinto during his testimony to Congress in May. "This wasn't a
soccer game that we played where the referee simply blows the whistle, the game comes to an end,
and we tabulate up the costs. If we do not shore up government finances, the military success that
we had in February will be undermined, because we will not be prepared to confront new military
challenges in the future."
Moreover, apart from the direct expenses for the war effort, Pinto and De la Torre also estimated
that government income this year will be 430 billion sucres (US$168 million) less than originally
anticipated when the 1995 budget was approved last year because of the general economic
slowdown resulting from the war. That, combined with the US$360 million in estimated military
expenditures, accounts for the US$528 million total fiscal deficit projected by the Duran Ballen
administration in May.
Consequently, on June 1, the government announced a series of emergency measures to attack
the deficit, in effect constituting a shock austerity plan to close the fiscal gap. The central measures
included huge telephone and electricity rate hikes, a 2% increase in fuel prices, and the elimination
of government fuel subsidies that the state had been providing for targeted business activities, such
as the fishing industry and banana farming. The electricity rate hikes were particularly severe. The
cost of electric energy for individuals and commercial establishments rose by a combined average
of 57%. Residential consumers suffered the most, with rate hikes averaging 139%, and in some
cases reaching as high as 500%, since the hikes were set on a sliding scale depending on the amount
consumed. Other measures included a wage freeze for all civil servants, new laws to crack down on
tax evaders, and a decision to make the one-time 2% tax on automobiles that the government had
decreed during the border war into a permanent annual tax on all motor vehicles.
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"It's not shock therapy or anything of the sort," said Pinto. "These are simply vital, corrective
measures to pay the bill for the war with Peru." Not surprisingly, however, the measures spurred
massive labor protests throughout the first half of June. Immediately after the government
announced the austerity program on June 1, high school and university students in Quito and
other urban centers often joined by worker and campesino organizations initiated a wave of street
demonstrations, many of which led to violent clashes with police.
In one such demonstration on June 8, a mob of students chased an anti-riot squad into a public
office building in Quito, hurling rocks and Molotov cocktails at the police. The officers remained
trapped in the building until the army arrived and disbursed the protesters. On June 3, the country's
largest labor confederation the 300,000-member Frente Unitario de los Trabajadores (FUT) began
preparing a national strike for June 14. FUT, which opened negotiations with other grassroots
organizations and campesino groups to form a united coalition against the government's austerity
program, also initiated protest marches in most urban centers around the country, especially in
Quito and in the sprawling port city of Guayaquil.
Among other labor protests, on June 5 the 110,000-member national teachers union (Union Nacional
de Educadores, UNE) initiated a countrywide strike against the government measures that shut
down the public school system. And, judicial workers and health workers from public hospitals
throughout the nation walked off their jobs as well at the beginning of June, both to protest the
government's policies and to demand wage hikes. Business associations also opposed the austerity
measures, arguing that the government should do more to cut spending to close the fiscal gap rather
than raise taxes and public service rates. "The new austerity package that the government is pushing
will have a very negative impact on productive growth this year," warned Andres Perez, president
of the Quito Chamber of Commerce. "The increase in electricity rates is particularly concerning
because Ecuador already has the most expensive electric energy rates in Latin America. If the rate
hikes take effect, it will substantially raise production costs for industry and commerce, and severely
cut our ability to compete on the market."
And, in Congress, the executive faced hostile reactions from opposition parties, which control 67 of
the 77 seats in the legislature. The executive had enjoyed a brief honeymoon with Congress during
the war with Peru. But since the conflict ended, opposition parties have reinitiated an aggressive
political campaign to roll back many of the Duran Ballen administration's policies and weaken
executive authority, thereby reviving the conflictive tone that dominated relations between the
executive and the legislature before the border war broke out (see NotiSur -Latin American Political
Affairs, 07/28/95). Opposition politicians claimed that the government has greatly exaggerated the
size of the fiscal deficit for 1995. They accused the Duran Ballen administration of taking advantage
of the war to enact harsh austerity measures that would allow the government to meet the debt
repayment commitments that it negotiated with foreign lending institutions and commercial
creditors in 1994 (see NotiSur, 05/19/94, 06/16/94, 07/21/94, 07/28/94, and 09/22/94).
In fact, opposition parties threatened to summon Finance Minister Pinto and Mining and Energy
Secretary Galo Abril for public hearings on the austerity package, warning that unless they could
clearly justify the measures, Congress would impeach them. Given the overwhelming opposition,
on June 10 President Duran Ballen agreed to temporarily suspend the austerity plan. A mixed
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executive-legislative commission was set up to accurately determine the size of the deficit and
jointly draw up alternative measures to close the fiscal gap. In early July, the commission revised
the deficit downward from the original estimate of US$528 million to just US$156 million, or less
than 1% of GDP, thereby implicitly validating the claim by opposition parties that the executive had
deliberately overstated the deficit to push forward with the structural adjustment program begun
before the war broke out. The commission is now debating what measures they will approve to close
the gap.
The central proposals under consideration are:
* a one-time, 20% tax on the estimated US$200 million in profits that the country's banks earned in
1994; * an 8% tax on credit-card transactions;
* a 2% annual tax on luxury cars; * a one-time tax of US$10 for all cellular phone users; * the
extension of the value-added tax (impuesto al valor agregado, IVA) to imports of food goods and
luxury items, as well as to business activities now exempt from the tax, such as agriculture and cattle
raising;
* legal reforms to allow the executive to aggressively crack down on tax evasion; and
* constitutional reforms that would pave the way for the privatization of the state
telecommunications enterprise Empresa Estatal de Telecomunicaciones (EMETEL), as well as the oil
firm Petroecuador and the state electric company Instituto Ecuatoriano de Electrificacion (INECEL).
The proposal to privatize EMETEL and the other two state institutes may be the most important
measure under negotiation for the Duran Ballen administration, and it may have paved the way
for the executive's decision to accept a much lower estimate of the fiscal deficit. Those three state
monopolies require special legislative approval as a prerequisite for privatization, since they are
considered "strategic" industries under the State Modernization Law that was approved in 1994 (see
NotiSur, 10/13/94 and 11/17/94).
Since last year, the executive has unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate congressional backing
for the sale of the monopolies, which forms the centerpiece of the Duran Ballen administration's
privatization program. Thus, congressional approval just to privatize EMETEL which is the first
firm up for negotiation in Congress would represent a major concession by opposition parties. In
addition, the firm's sale would earn much more than the US$156 million fiscal deficit that the mixed
commission settled on, meaning that the Duran Ballen government would still be able to generate
much of the revenue that it had originally estimated would be needed to cover the full expenses of
the war.
The sale of EMETEL and the other two monopolies, however, would generate a harsh backlash
from the country's labor movement, which bitterly opposes the entire privatization program.
The suspension of the government's austerity plan in June especially the decision to revoke the
public service rate hikes led to a temporary lull in protests by grassroots organizations. In midJuly, however, workers from EMETEL, Petroecuador, and INECEL held a 48-hour work stoppage
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to pressure Congress not to cave in to the executive demand to privatize those firms. Congress did
agree to hold hearings with union leaders to consider their position, but negotiations continue with
the Duran Ballen administration over privatization of the monopolies, foreshadowing more strikes
in the coming weeks.
"We agreed to suspend the strike temporarily," said union leader Henry Yanez, referring to the
work stoppage in the three state monopolies in mid-July. "But the strike has basically only been
postponed. We will resume our original tactic if they (legislators) close off the dialogue." [Sources:
Inter Press Service, 05/03/95, 06/07/95; Ecuador Economic News, US Embassy-International Market
Insights (Quito), 05/16/95, 06/09/95; United Press International, 04/21/95, 06/19/95; Notimex, 04/07/95,
04/13/95, 04/30/95, 05/08/95, 06/12/95, 07/13/95, 07/16/95, 07/17/95; Associated Press, 04/21/95,
06/08/95, 07/17/95; Agence France-Presse, 04/06/95, 04/10/95, 04/12/95, 05/08/95, 05/10/95, 05/13/95,
05/15/95, 05/16/95, 05/22/95, 05/29-31/95, 06/01-03/95, 06/05/95, 06/07/95, 06/08/95, 06/10/95, 06/12/95,
06/14/95, 06/19/95, 06/22/95, 07/04/95, 07/06/95, 07/09/95, 07/10/95, 07/12/95, 07/15/95, 07/19/95,
07/22/95; Reuter, 04/07/95, 04/20/95, 04/21/95, 04/27/95, 05/02/95, 05/23/95, 05/29/95, 06/11/95,
06/12/95, 06/15/95, 07/07/95, 07/13/95, 07/15/95, 07/23/95]

-- End --
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